Lonergan discusses judgments of value: "Judgments of value or simple or comparative. They affirm or deny that some x is truly or only apparently good. Or they compare distinct instances of the truly good to affirm or deny that one is better or more important, or more urgent than the other" (456).
Whether the judgment is objective or subjective depends if it comes from a self-transcending subject or an authentic self.
Lonergan states, Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact" (456). They differ in value because one affirm what does not exist or disapprove what does. They do not differ in structure because both differentiates between criterion and meaning. Lonergan states, "In both, the criterion is the self-transcendence of the subject, which, however, is only cognitive in judgments of fact but is heading towards moral self-transcendence in judgments of value. In both, the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject: judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better" (456).
Lonergan speaks of judgments of value: "True judgments of value go beyond merely intentional self-transcendence without reaching the fullness of moral self-transcendence. That fullness is not merely knowing but also doing, and man can know what is right without doing it" (456-457).
In between judgments of fact and judgments of value are apprehensions of value. These apprehensions are given in feelings. "Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements" (457).
In judgments of value, three things combine. "First, there is knowledge of reality and especially human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust to moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself" (457). Judgment of value requires knowledge of human reality. Knowledge by itself is not enough to make judgments of value, therefore, moral feelings must be developed. Finally, Lonergan says, "the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one" (457-458). This discovery helps to emerge in one's consciousness "the significance of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility"(458). One's continual experience of one's weaknesses causes to emerge the question of one's salvation and the question of God.
There is both development and failure which means that the judgments of value "occur in different contexts" (458). In the context of growth, one's knowledge and living is constantly improving or advancing from vital values to religious values. There is also an openness to continual improvement or growth. The only problem is that "continuous growth seems to be rare" (458). There are diversions from the correct path. There are refusals to keep moving forward. There are the desire for comfort and ease. There are attempts to quiet an uneasy conscience by rejecting the better values. One's outlook becomes clouded by biases. One even begins to hate the good.
Lonergan goes on to talk about the differences between horizontal and vertical liberty based on a study by Joseph de Finance. "Horizontal liberty is the exercise of liberty within a determinate horizon and from the basis of a corresponding existential stance. Vertical liberty is the exercise of liberty that selects that stance and the corresponding horizon" (459). Horizontal liberty is to make choices within one's horizon. Vertical liberty is to make choices beyond one's horizon. "Such vertical liberty may be implicit: it occurs in responding to the motives that lead one to ever fuller authenticity, or ignoring such motives and drifting into an ever less authentic selfhood. But it also can be explicit. Then one is responding to the transcendental notion of value, by determining what it would be worthwhile for one to make of oneself, and what it would be worthwhile for one to do for one's fellow men" (459).
Lonergan next describes the structure of the human good. The human good is both individual and social. Lonergan selects eighteen terms and relates them to each other. First he relates capacity, operation, particular good, and need. "Individuals, then, have capacities for operating. By operating they procure themselves instances of the particular good" (460-461). The next four terms related are cooperation, institution, role, and task. "Individuals, then, live in groups. To a notable extent their operating is cooperating. It flows some settled pattern, and this pattern is fixed by a role to be fulfilled or a task to be performed within an institutional framework. Such frame-works are the family and manners (mores), society and education, the state and the law, the economy and technology, the church and sect" (461). These frameworks are the basic means for cooperation. They tend to change slowly, unless, their are major breakdowns. The third group of terms are plasticity, perfectibility, development, skill, and the good of order. "The capacities of individuals, then, for the performance of operations, because they are plastic and perfectible, admit the development of skills and, indeed, of the very skills demanded by institutional roles and tasks" (461).
The good of order is related to the particular good. Lonergan states, "This concrete manner, in which cooperation actually is working out, is what is meant by the good of order" (461). An example would be lunch today for me would be a particular good. "But dinner every day for all members of the group that earn it is part of the good of order" (461). The good of order makes it possible to acquire particular goods.
Another group of terms for the human good are liberty, orientation, conversion, personal relations, and terminal values" (462). "Liberty means, of course, not indeterminism, but self-determination. Any course of individual or group action is only a finite good and, because only finite, it is open to criticism. It has its alternatives, its limitations, its risks, its drawbacks. Accordingly, the process of deliberation and evaluation is not itself decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action and proceeding to execute it. Now in so far as that thrust of the self regularly opts, not for merely the apparent good, but for the true good, the self is thereby is achieving moral self-transcendence; he is existing authentically; he is constituting himself as an originating value, and he is bringing about terminal values, namely a good of order that is truly good and instances of the particular good that are truly good" (462).
"Liberty is exercised within a matrix of personal relations. In the cooperating community persons are bound together by their needs and by the common good that meet their needs" (463).
Terminal values are values that are accepted and executed as "true instances of the particular good" (463). Related to terminal values are the persons that do the choosing. "They are authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices" (463). The subject can will authenticity both for himself and others.
Last we speak of the orientation of the community as a group. Lonergan discusses the orientation of the individual within the community. This main happens with the transcendental notions that "both enable us and require us to advance in understanding, to judge truthfully, to respond to values" (464). This demand requires development of the individual. "One has to acquire the skills and learning of a competent human being in some walk of life. One has to grow in sensitivity and responsiveness to values if one's humanity is to be authentic" (464). However, this development is not guaranteed, success varies with different individuals. There are some who do not succeed. There are some that meet minimum requirements. There are others who develop throughout their life.
As we have shown our orientation is in the way of development, conversion is a "change of direction", a change that is an improvement.
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