Proving God's Existence Part 5

6 Fifth Way

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things

which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is

evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as

to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly,

do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move

towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge

and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some

intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their

end; and this being we call God.

The Fifth Way, called the “argument from design” is one of the best known of the five ways because it continues to be argued by many apologists in the current time. Some, however, think it has been proven false by evolution.  It seems evident that many things exist in the world without intelligence and they seem to act with an end or a goal. For example, an acorn turns into a tree, a match lights a fire, a dog barks, and so on. Feser states, “In each of these cases and countless others we have regularities that points to ends or goals, usually totally unconscious, which are just built into nature and can be known through observation to be there whether or not it ever occurs to ask anyone how they got there.” Why and how does nature have a purpose (telos) built into it? Where ends or goals, usually totally unconscious, which are just built into nature and can be known through observation to be there whether or not it ever occurs to ask anyone how they got there.” Why and how does nature have a purpose (telos) built into it? Where understanding; no intention to an end can proceed from them. This intention must exist in an intellect on which things depend.” If this is true, why is it true? An obvious answer that someone is directing them to their chosen end. This being that directs them to their end, Aquinas argues, is God.

7 Conclusion

Aquinas thought that the existence of God could be proved from the things that existed in the world. He thought that the existence of God was the explanation that certain effects existed. In the Summa Theologica, he argued for five ways to prove the existence of God. The first three arguments are similar to the cosmological argument. The fourth way is the argument from different graduation of being. The fifth way is a type of design argument, but different from the design argument of William Paley. Some will be convinced by them; others will not. It must be kept in mind that these arguments are summary arguments that Aquinas argues more extensively in other of his works. Second, it must be understood, it is located in a work designed for beginners in theology.

Proving God's Existence Part 4

5 Fourth Way

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there

are some more and some less good, true, noble, and the like. But ‘more’ and ‘less’ are

predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways

something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more

nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, and,

consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest

in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any

genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the

cause of all hot things. Therefore there must be also something which is to all beings

the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The Fourth Way argues for the existence of God because of the different levels of perfection. Aquinas states that in the first part of this proof that in beings “there are some more or less good, true, and noble.” He assumes that since there are beings with “more” or “less” of these qualities, there must be a being that has the “maximum” of these qualities. In the second part of the proof Aquinas seems to be connecting truth with being. He asserts, “there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest, and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being.” In the first part of this quote, Aquinas argues that the qualities of the good, true, and noble exist in a supreme being who has the maximum amount of these qualities. In other words, there must be a perfect standard in which people evaluate the “more” or better.

The second part of the quote is puzzling: “For those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being.” What does this mean? Kreeft states, “But a thing must first be before it can be good (thus whatever has goodness must also have being), and every thing that has being also has some goodness (cf. S.T. I, 5, 3); therefore goodness and being are coextensive. The concept of degrees of being can be understood if we remember that ‘being’ means not simply existence (‘to be or not to be’) but also essence (what a thing is, its nature), and this latter aspect of being admits of degrees.” Kreeft seems to be saying that there is a close relationship between being and goodness. To have being is to have some goodness. In other writings, Aquinas states to have being is good or goodness. Davies supports this point. He asserts, “To understand the Fourth Way one needs to realize that Aquinas regularly takes being, truth, and goodness to be related in a serious way. For him, something that has being is always to some extent good.” So Davies supports the idea that there is a relationship between being and goodness, but what about truth and being. Aquinas states that what is greatest in truth is greatest in being. Davies suggests, “He also thinks that things that exist and are, therefore, good in some way can be thought of as true in that they possess what our minds can latch onto as intelligible.” There is, therefore, a strong relationship between being and truth. Aquinas is saying that when we grasp truth that we are grasping what is real.
In the last part of the proof Aquinas states that what is greatest in being causes that being in others.

One might say that to be good, true, or noble, one must first exist. Kreeft thinks that the basic point in the fourth way is that “better implies best.” However, is it really necessary to assume a best because something is better? Maybe, we are comparing different degrees of being we see in others.

Proving God's Existence Part 3

4 Third Way

We find in nature

things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and

to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible

for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.

Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been

nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in

existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already

existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been

impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be

in  existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there

must exist something the existence of which is necessary.

But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is

impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity

caused by another, as has already been proved in regard to efficient causes.

Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself

its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their

necessity. This all men speak of as God.

Davies, in introducing the Third Way states, “Aquinas begins the third way by saying some things come into being and pass out of being, that there are as he puts it, things which are ‘able to be or not to be,’ things which might be called ‘contingent’.” Aquinas is thinking how people are born and that they die. People’s birth is dependent upon the existence of the world and when they die, the world continues to exist. Aquinas seems to be distinguishing between necessary beings and contingent beings. He is thinking of contingent things as something that is born and that eventually dies. In other words, its existence is not necessary.

In the second part of the argument Aquinas says that if everything is contingent, the world would not exist, but the world does exist, therefore, there must be a being or beings that are not contingent. Davies explains, “The Third Way is arguing that not everything can be able to be or not to be because all such things depend on something for their being there, and without something not merely able to be or not to be there would be nothing at all.” If everything is contingent or depends on another for its existence, it seems for anyone to exist there must be a necessary being.

In the last part, Aquinas argues that there must be a necessary being whose existence is not dependent upon another. He asserts, “Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has already been proved in regard to efficient causes.” Aquinas seems to be saying that there are some necessary beings that are dependent upon others for its existence and there must be a necessary being who is not dependent for its existence on another.  Feser thinks that the “only thing that could stop an explanatory regress of necessary beings would therefore be something whose essence and existence are identical, and who is a necessarily existing being precisely because it just is subsistent being or existence.” Feser seems to be drawing from Aquinas’ larger works how God’s essence and existence is the same. This is true for only God. This seems to imply essence to exist. This necessary being whose existence is not dependent upon another is what everyone understands as God.

Proving God's Existence Part 2

3 Second Way

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an

order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing

is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes

following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause

of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or one only. Now to take away

the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there is to be no first cause among efficient

causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in intermediate causes is

possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will be there an ultimate

effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary

to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The Second Way is “similar” to the First Way, “but rather than focusing on motion, it focuses on efficient causation.” Peter Kreeft states, “Efficient cause for Aristotle meant only cause of change, cause of form informing matter. But for St. Thomas it means also the cause of the very existence of the effect.” Kreeft thinks that the second way “goes beyond the first: the first proved God as the cause of universal change; the second proves God as cause of the very existence of the universe.” The First Way pointed how that the existence of change was obvious to everyone. Second, Aquinas concludes that a first mover was the cause of motion. In the second way, he argues that for intermediate causes to exist, there must be a “first efficient cause.”

In the Second Way, people find the existence of efficient causes in the world and that they are “ordered in a series.” Aquinas agreed with Aristotle’s assertion that there are four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. Davies states, “But, in addition to material, formal, and final causes, there are, according to Aquinas, ‘efficient causes,’ which he thinks of as what we appeal to when we offer explanations in terms of the activity of something (or of many things). With efficient causation, the focus, for Aquinas falls on questions of the form ‘What did that?’, or keeps that going’?” So, efficient causes cause certain effects. Aquinas argues that no efficient cause can be the cause of itself. Aquinas concludes that a first cause is needed to explain the existence of intermediate causes and this first cause is God.

Proving God's Existence Part 1

According to the Apostle Paul, “For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made” (Romans 1:19-20). This argument by the Apostle Paul is defended by Aquinas in many of his writings. His best known arguments for the existence of God are his Five Ways that Aquinas offers “near the beginning of his Summa theologiae to establish the existence of God.” The Five Ways “amounts to only a few paragraphs” in the Summa theologiae. Many readers might think the Five Ways exhaust his arguments for the existence of God. This is definitely not true; in fact, arguments for the existence of God are located in many of his works in a more extensive format. (Summa Contra Gentiles, Existence and Existent)  Edward Feser, speaking on the topic of the Five Ways asserts, “But it is crucial to understand that they are summaries. Aquinas never intended for them to stand alone, and would probably have reacted with horror if told that future generations of students would be studying them in isolation, removed from their immediate context in the Summa Theologiae and the larger context of his work as a whole.” It is important to remember that the Five Ways takes up space of a few pages in a work that is more than one thousand pages. Second, it is in a book written for beginners in theology.

2 The First Way

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses,

that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion

by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which

it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the

reduction of something from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state

of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially

hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that

the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but

only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially

hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same

respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e., that it should

move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that

by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must be put in motion

by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then

there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent

movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff

moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at

a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Aquinas says that the First Way is the most evident way. The way starts from things that are “evident to our senses.” It starts “from the fact that some things in the world undergo change (motus), meaning that they vary in place, quantity, and quality.” In other words, people move from one place to another, a tree grows from an acorn to a tree, people can slim down, individuals can go from not knowing to knowing. These are all examples of change that occur in the world. It is clear that change occurs in the world. As Aquinas says, “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.” For example, people have the potential to learn how to read, write, add, and think. However, these things are not realized in them when they are born.

How can these changes be explained? Aquinas says, “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality, except by something in the state of actuality.” Aquinas is saying if that something or someone changes in the state of potentiality, the change must occur from something in actuality. Feser asserts, “it is impossible for anything to be at the same time and in the same respect both that which is moved or changed and that which does the moving or changing.” It seems something in the process of change cannot be the cause of that change. In the next part of the argument, Aquinas argues that there must be an unmoved mover. Feser explains why: “By the same token, if that which puts something else in motion is itself moving, there must be yet something further moving it and so on. But if such a series went on to infinity, then there would be no first mover; and if there were no first mover, there would be no other movers.” This seems to make sense. If everything is in motion and dependent on something else, it seems there has to be a immovable mover not in motion to move another. Aquinas concludes that this first mover is God. It is important that in these Five Ways of proving the existence of God Aquinas is not arguing for a “developed doctrine of God.” Aquinas’ intention is more limited than this. He is not trying to describe the essence of God or what God is in Himself. Instead, the Five Ways argue from effect to cause to show that God exists, not the existence of God.