Truth, Goodness, and Beauty Part 3

Truth, Goodness, and Beauty Part 3

3 Goodness

Moving from truth to goodness, what is the relationship between art and goodness? Is there a moral value of art? Does the artist have a moral responsibility? Should an artist moralize? Should art be censored? These are important questions dealing with the relationship between art and morality. Kant states that 

“the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and only in this light . . . does it give us pleasure with an attendant claim to the agreement of everyone else, whereupon the mind becomes conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere sensibility to pleasure from impressions of sense, and also appraises the worth of others on the score of a like maxim of their judgment.” Kant is saying that beauty is connected to goodness and this goodness justifies universal acceptance. In addition, beauty should ennoble the person. Kant goes on to say that the “freedom of the imagination . . . is, in estimating the beautiful, represented as in accord with the understanding’s conformity to law (in moral judgments the freedom of the will is thought as the harmony of the latter with itself according to universal laws of reason).”

 Kant thinks that aesthetic judgments should be in conformity with the moral law. Art should not debase the person. It seems he would argue that art must agree with natural law and the law of reason.

The movement of art for art’s sake rose up during the nineteenth century. This view believed that if “art is to be valued for its own sake then it must be detached from all purposes, including those of the moral life. A work of art that moralizes, that strives to improve the audience, that descends from the pinnacle of pure beauty to take up some social or didactic cause, offends against the autonomy of the aesthetic experience, exchanging intrinsic for instrumental values and losing whatever claim it might have had to beauty.” This seems to be an extreme view. It completely divorces art from morality. On the other hand, Plato forbids the poets from entering his city in the Republic, but allows for the philosopher, who knows the truth, to be a poet. In addition, Plato uses poetic devices in the Republic: allegory, analogy, metaphor, simile, etc.. Then, there are religious people who actively censor different kinds of art. Is there no middle ground?

Scruton thinks that it is a “failing in a work of art that it should be more concerned to convey a message than to delight its audience.” There are works of art that use art as a propaganda tool. “The lessons urged upon us are neither compelled by the story nor illustrated in the exaggerated figures and characters; the propaganda message is not part of aesthetic meaning but extraneous to it.” An example of using art for political propaganda is Mikhail Sholokhov’s Quiet Flows the Don. There are works of art that integrate their moral message “in an aesthetically integrated frame.” John Bunyan’s Pilgrims’s Progress presents a work in which both the form and the content are aesthetically integrated. 

Hegel states that the idea is the content of art. The first attribute of art requires that the content, “which is to be offered to artistic representation, shall show itself to be worthy of representation.” Hegel is saying that not just any ideas should be represented in art. He thinks both the content and the form should be good. Second, the idea should not be represented in abstract form. The idea must be manifested concretely. Hegel states that the imagination is the “proper medium” and that the imagination “is essential to every product that belongs to the beautiful, whatever type it may be.” Hegel is saying that works of art are communicated through the imagination, not the reason. Art communicates truth differently than science. He is also stating that both the content and the form must be closely intertwined. In other words, the content cannot be extraneous to the form. Both content and form communicate truth through the imagination.

Scruton does think that art should have moral value. He thinks it is morally wrong when art presents vice in such a way that makes it attractive. There are different kinds of ways that evil can be presented in art. First, it can be presented in such a way that the reader must make a moral judgment about it. Second, it can be presented in such a way that the reader is shown how an action is evil. Finally, evil can be presented in such a way that attracts the reader to it. For example, it influences the reader to think of evil as good. Scruton thinks art can be moral, but should not be moralizing. Scruton writes, “Works of art are forbidden to moralize, only because moralizing destroys the true moral value, which lies in the ability to open our eyes to others, and to discipline our sympathies towards life as it is. Art is not morally neutral, but it has its own way of making and justifying moral claims.”

Truth, Goodness, and Beauty Part 2

Truth, Goodness, and Beauty Part 2

2 Truth

Scruton argues that after the Enlightenment, there was a movement to make art a rival to religion because art had a different type of status than science. Science was a threat to religion. Science was able to offer alternative explanations to the teachings of religion. For example, the theory of evolution was favored by the educated over the creation stories of Genesis. This so-called debunking of religion influenced some people to consider art as a different way than science to find truth. Scruton asserts, “But art seemed to represent a different way of looking at the world from science, one which preserved the mystery of things and didn’t undo the mystery. Since the mystery was so important, why not look to art as a source of meaning?” 

Kant thinks the judging of anything as beautiful is aesthetic, a judgment of taste. Kant writes: “The judgment of taste, therefore, is not a cognitive judgment, and so is not logical, but is aesthetic--whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective.” What does Kant mean when he says that the judgment of taste is not cognitive? What does he mean when he says that the judgment of taste is subjective? Is he saying that a judgment of taste is relative? Scruton states, “The status of beauty as an ultimate value is questionable, in the way that the status of truth and goodness are not.” He goes on to say, however, even truth and goodness is questioned as an absolute value today. 

Although Kant states that aesthetic judgment is “rooted in subjective experience,” does this mean there is no objectivity to aesthetic judgment? Kant does not seem to draw that conclusion. Kant states, “Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The object of such a delight is called Beautiful.” Kant, however, states that this judgment of taste “must be coupled with it a claim to subjective universality.” Kant is saying that a judgment of taste or aesthetic judgment is determined subjectively, but has universal validity. Kant seems to be saying that an aesthetic judgment is both subjective and objective. In addition, it has ultimate value. Kant is saying that an aesthetic judgment is a way to acquire knowledge in a non-cognitive way.

What can one learn from art? Does art communicate truth? Is the truth provided by art a truth that cannot be discovered any other way? There are different kinds of art: abstract and representational art. Representational art will include novels, plays, films, and poetry. These different types of art do not give us literal truth about the world, but another kind of truth. These truths are accessed through the imagination. Scruton writes, “Our favorite works of art seem to guide us to the truth of the human condition.” One might say, science speaks about the general, but the novelist speaks about the individual. Fiction is not offering information to be consumed, but worlds of the imagination to experience.

Truth, Goodness, and Beauty Part 1

Truth, Goodness, and Beauty Part 1

The idea of beauty as an ultimate value goes back to Plato. Scruton writes: “According to this idea beauty is an ultimate value--something that we pursue for its own sake, and for the pursuit of which no further reason needs to be given. Beauty should therefore be compared to truth and goodness, one member of a trio of ultimate values which justify our rational inclination.” Truth is usually associated with reason or science; the good is usually associated with religion and ethics; and finally, beauty is usually associated with art. The question that must be asked is there a relationship between truth, goodness, and beauty? Is there a relationship between art and truth, goodness, and beauty?

First, art needs to be defined. What is art? The word art has many different meanings, but in the more recent times the definition has been focused on the fine arts. In the 19th century, art became identified with the new discipline of aesthetics. Scruton notes, “Only in the course of the nineteenth century, and in the wake of Hegel’s posthumously published lectures on aesthetics, did the topic of art come to replace that of natural beauty as the core subject matter of aesthetics.” The definition of art in the history of Western Civilization has had a broader meaning. In this tradition, there have been different kinds of arts. Both healing and teaching are recognized as arts. Another kind of art is the liberal arts, cultivating the skills of the mind. Other kinds of arts are arts and crafts, industrial arts, and the useful arts. In the history of Western Civilization, the useful arts have been more prominent than the fine arts until recent times. Although this paper is aware of the broader definition of the arts, it will concentrate on the fine arts, especially, literature, music, painting and sculpture. The question this paper asks is: What is the relationship between truth, goodness, beauty, and the fine arts?

The Lonergan Reader, Part 3, Chapter 4: Religion

Lonergan asserts, "The facts of good and evil, of progress and decline, raise questions about the character of our universe" (472). These questions have been asked in a variety of ways. The transcendental method brings a unity to these questions. "We can inquire into the possibility of fruitful inquiry. We can reflect on the nature of reflection. We can deliberate whether our deliberating is worthwhile" (472). Behind these questions is the question of God.

Lonergan writes, "The possibility of inquiry on the side of the subject lies in his intelligence, in his drive to know what, why, how, and in his ability to reach intellectually satisfying answers" (472). Why do we desire to know everything about everything? Why are there answers to our questions? Why is the world intelligible? Why should our answers be related to the universe? Why do we assume they do? "So implicitly we grant that the universe is intelligible and, once that is granted,there arises the question whether the universe could be intelligible without having an intelligent ground" (472). Once again, this is the question of God.

Lonergan inquires about our reflections and judgments. "Again, to reflect on reflection is to ask just what happens when we marshal and weigh evidence for pronouncing that this is probably is so and that probably is not so. ... Judgment proceed rationally from a grasp of a virtual unconditioned. By an unconditioned is meant any 'x' that has no conditions. By virtually unconditioned is meant any 'x' that has no unfulfilled conditions. ... To marshal the evidence is to ascertain whether all the conditions are fulfilled. To weigh the evidence is to ascertain whether the fulfillment of the conditions certainly or probably involves the existence or occurrence of the conditioned" (473).

Lonergan states that this explanation of judgment implies another element. If we are going to talk about a virtually unconditioned, then, we must also talk about the unconditioned. Lonergan explains, "The virtually unconditioned has no unfulfilled conditions. The strictly unconditioned has no conditions whatever. In traditional terms, the former is a contingent being, and the latter is a necessary being" (473). In more modern terms, the virtually unconditioned has to do with our world of possible being; the strictly unconditioned has to do with something beyond our world. In both cases, however, the question of God emerges. "Does a necessary being exist? Does there exist a reality that transcends the reality of this world?" (473).

Lonergan asks about our own deliberating, choosing, and deciding. "To deliberate abut 'x' is to ask whether 'x' is worthwhile. To deliberate about deliberating is to ask whether any deliberating is worthwhile" (473). Does worthwhile have any "ultimate meaning?" (473) Is moral living "consonant with the world?" (473) We praise people for their growth in attention, insight, reasonableness, and responsibility. We praise good and renounce evil. We praise progress and reject decline. "But is the universe on our side?" (473). These questions or reflections causes to emerge the question, "Does there or does there not necessarily exist a transcendent, intelligent ground of the universe? Is that ground or are we the primary instance of moral consciousness?" (473)

Behind our questions lie the question of God. "At their root there is the same transcendental tendency of the human heart that questions, that questions without restriction, that questions the significance of its own questioning, and so comes the question of God" (474).

The question of God lies behind all our questioning, "so being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality" (474). That fulfillment brings a deep joy that can endure despite the trials of life. That fulfillment brings a lasting peace that overcomes the world. That fulfillment leads to loving one's neighbor. On the other hand, the absence of that fulfillment "opens the way to trivilization of human life in the pursuit of fun, to the harshness of human life arising from the ruthless exercise of power, to despair about human welfare springing from the conviction that the universe is absurd" (474).

Lonergan describes being-in-love-with-God. "Being in love with God, as experienced, is being in love in an unrestricted fashion. All love is self-surrender, but being in love with God is being in love without limits or qualifications or conditions or reservations. Just as unrestricted questioning is our capacity for self-transcendence, so being in love in an unrestricted fashion is the proper fulfillment of that capacity" (474-475).

That fulfillment is not produced by us, but is God's gift. It is not a "product of our knowledge and choice" (475). It is a result of conversion, "it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our choosing and knowing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing" (475).

Lonergan states that though it is not a product of our knowing and choosing, it is a "conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace, that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control (Gal. 5, 22)" (475).

Though this dynamic state is conscious, it is not necessarily known. "For consciousness is just experience," but knowledge is a combination of experience, understanding, and judgment. Lonergan says because it is conscious without being known, "it is an experience of mystery. Because it is being in love, the mystery is not merely attractive but fascinating; to it one belongs; by it one is possessed. Because it is an unmeasured love, the mystery evokes awe. Of itself, then inasmuch as it is conscious without being known, the gift of God's love is an experience of the holy, of Rudolf Otto's mysterium fascinans et tremendum. It is what Paul Tillich named being grasped by ultimate concern. It corresponds to St. Ignatius Loyola's consolation that has no cause, as expounded by Karl Rahner" (475).

The religious experience is conscious on the fourth level of intentional consciousness. It is not the consciousness of the first level of empirical consciousness. It is not the consciousness of the second level of intellectual consciousness. It is not the consciousness of the third level of rational consciousness. It is the consciousness of the fourth level of consciousness of deliberation. Lonergan writes, "It is the type of consciousness that deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, acts responsibly and freely. But it is this consciousness as brought to fulfillment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness" (475-476).

Being in love with God does not lead in a straight line upward, but more like up and down. "For that love is the utmost in self-transcendence, and man's self-transcendence is ever precarious. Of itself, self-transcendence involves tension between the self as transcending and the self as transcended. So, human authenticity is never some pure and serene and secure possession" (476).

Lonergan states that faith is "knowledge born of religious love" (477). First, there is "knowledge born of love" (477). Lonergan thinks this is similar to Pascal's "the heart has reasons which reason does not know" (477). This is a knowledge from the heart and affections. Lonergan explains, "By the heart's reasons I would understand feelings that are intentional responses to values ... Finally, by the heart I understand the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love. The meaning, then, of Pascal's remark would be that, besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value of a person in love" (477).

This knowledge of faith is a result of God's love being poured into our heart. Lonergan states that added to our apprehension of "vital, social, and cultural values" is the "apprehension of transcendent value" (477). This apprehensions "consists in the experienced fulfillment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, in our actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe" (477-478). Lonergan adds, "Since that thrust is of intelligence to the intelligible, of reasonableness to the true and real, of freedom and responsibility to the truly good, the experienced fulfillment of that thrust in its unrestrictedness may be objectified as a clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality, absolute goodness and holiness" (478). This presents the question of God in a new "form". It turns it into a question of decision. Will I love him in response to his love for me? Will I live out that love toward others? The question of God's existence is now secondary.

Lonergan says that faith has both an absolute as well as relative aspect. Lonergan writes, "It places all other values in the light and the shadow of transcendent value. In the shadow, for transcendent value links itself to all other values to transform, magnify, and glorify them. Without faith the originating value is man and the terminal value is the human good that man brings about. But in the light of faith, originating value is divine light and love, while terminal value is the whole universe. So the human good becomes absorbed in an all-encompassing good" (478).

Faith is the answer to the problem of evil. "Without faith, without the eye of love, the world is too evil for God to be good, for a good God to exist. But faith recognizes that God grants men their freedom, that he wills them to be persons and not just his automata, that he calls them to the higher authenticity that overcomes evil with good. So faith is linked with human progress and it has to meet the challenge of human decline" (479).

The Lonergan Reader, Part 3, Chapter 3: Realms of Meaning

Different circumstances or contexts bring about "different modes of consciousness and intentional operation, and different modes of such operation give rise to different realms of meaning" (467).

Two realms of meaning are common sense and theory. Lonergan distinguishes between the two: both of them "regard the same objects. But the objects are viewed from such different standpoints," (467) that you have to switch from one realm to the other when dealing with the objects. The realm of common sense deals with objects in relation to us. The realm of theory deals with objects in their relations to each other. A third realm of meaning is the "appropriation of one's own interiority, one's subjectivity, one's operations, their structure, their norms, their potentialities" (468). This appropriation resembles theory. "But in itself it is a heightening of intentional consciousness, an attending not merely to objects but also to the intending subject and his acts" (468). This self-appropriation provides the evidence "for one's account of evidence" (468).

The appropriation of interiority is related to both common sense and theory. The subject returns to the "realms of common sense and theory with the ability to meet the methodical exigence. For self-appropriation of itself is a grasp of transcendental method, and the grasp provides one with the tools not only for an analysis of commonsense procedures but also for the differentiation of the sciences and the construction of their methods" (469).

Finally, according to Lonergan, there is the "transcendent exigence. There is to human inquiry an unrestricted demand for intelligibility. There is to human judgment a demand for the unconditioned. There is to human deliberation a criterion that criticizes every finite good. So it is ... that man can reach basic fulfillment, peace, joy, only by moving beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority and into the ream in which God is known and loved" (469). This is the realm of the transcendent. So we have four realms of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence.

The Lonergan Reader, Part 3, chapter 2: The Human Good

Lonergan discusses judgments of value: "Judgments of value or simple or comparative. They affirm or deny that some x is truly or only apparently good. Or they compare distinct instances of the truly good to affirm or deny that one is better or more important, or more urgent than the other" (456).

Whether the judgment is objective or subjective depends if it comes from a self-transcending subject or an authentic self.

Lonergan states, Judgments of value differ in content but not in structure from judgments of fact" (456). They differ in value because one affirm what does not exist or disapprove what does. They do not differ in structure because both differentiates between criterion and meaning. Lonergan states, "In both, the criterion is the self-transcendence of the subject, which, however, is only cognitive in judgments of fact but is heading towards moral self-transcendence in judgments of value. In both, the meaning is or claims to be independent of the subject: judgments of fact state or purport to state what is or is not so; judgments of value state or purport to state what is or is not truly good or really better" (456).

Lonergan speaks of judgments of value: "True judgments of value go beyond merely intentional self-transcendence without reaching the fullness of moral self-transcendence. That fullness is not merely knowing but also doing, and man can know what is right without doing it" (456-457).

In between judgments of fact and judgments of value are apprehensions of value. These apprehensions are given in feelings. "Apprehensions of value occur in a further category of intentional response which greets either the ontic value of a person or the qualitative value of beauty, of understanding, of truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts, of great achievements" (457).

In judgments of value, three things combine. "First, there is knowledge of reality and especially human reality. Secondly, there are intentional responses to values. Thirdly, there is the initial thrust to moral self-transcendence constituted by the judgment of value itself" (457). Judgment of value requires knowledge of human reality. Knowledge by itself is not enough to make judgments of value, therefore, moral feelings must be developed. Finally, Lonergan says, "the development of knowledge and the development of moral feeling head to the existential discovery, the discovery of oneself as a moral being, the realization that one not only chooses between courses of action but also thereby makes oneself an authentic human being or an unauthentic one" (457-458). This discovery helps to emerge in one's consciousness "the significance of personal value and the meaning of personal responsibility"(458). One's continual experience of one's weaknesses causes to emerge the question of one's salvation and the question of God.

There is both development and failure which means that the judgments of value "occur in different contexts" (458). In the context of growth, one's knowledge and living is constantly improving or advancing from vital values to religious values. There is also an openness to continual improvement or growth. The only problem is that "continuous growth seems to be rare" (458). There are diversions from the correct path. There are refusals to keep moving forward. There are the desire for comfort and ease. There are attempts to quiet an uneasy conscience by rejecting the better values. One's outlook becomes clouded by biases. One even begins to hate the good.

Lonergan goes on to talk about the differences between horizontal and vertical liberty based on a study by Joseph de Finance. "Horizontal liberty is the exercise of liberty within a determinate horizon and from the basis of a corresponding existential stance. Vertical liberty is the exercise of liberty that selects that stance and the corresponding horizon" (459). Horizontal liberty is to make choices within one's horizon. Vertical liberty is to make choices beyond one's horizon. "Such vertical liberty may be implicit: it occurs in responding to the motives that lead one to ever fuller authenticity, or ignoring such motives and drifting into an ever less authentic selfhood. But it also can be explicit. Then one is responding to the transcendental notion of value, by determining what it would be worthwhile for one to make of oneself, and what it would be worthwhile for one to do for one's fellow men" (459).

Lonergan next describes the structure of the human good. The human good is both individual and social. Lonergan selects eighteen terms and relates them to each other. First he relates capacity, operation, particular good, and need. "Individuals, then, have capacities for operating. By operating they procure themselves instances of the particular good" (460-461). The next four terms related are cooperation, institution, role, and task. "Individuals, then, live in groups. To a notable extent their operating is cooperating. It flows some settled pattern, and this pattern is fixed by a role to be fulfilled or a task to be performed within an institutional framework. Such frame-works are the family and manners (mores), society and education, the state and the law, the economy and technology, the church and sect" (461). These frameworks are the basic means for cooperation. They tend to change slowly, unless, their are major breakdowns. The third group of terms are plasticity, perfectibility, development, skill, and the good of order. "The capacities of individuals, then, for the performance of operations, because they are plastic and perfectible, admit the development of skills and, indeed, of the very skills demanded by institutional roles and tasks" (461).

The good of order is related to the particular good. Lonergan states, "This concrete manner, in which cooperation actually is working out, is what is meant by the good of order" (461). An example would be lunch today for me would be a particular good. "But dinner every day for all members of the group that earn it is part of the good of order" (461). The good of order makes it possible to acquire particular goods.

Another group of terms for the human good are liberty, orientation, conversion, personal relations, and terminal values" (462). "Liberty means, of course, not indeterminism, but self-determination. Any course of individual or group action is only a finite good and, because only finite, it is open to criticism. It has its alternatives, its limitations, its risks, its drawbacks. Accordingly, the process of deliberation and evaluation is not itself decisive, and so we experience our liberty as the active thrust of the subject terminating the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action and proceeding to execute it. Now in so far as that thrust of the self regularly opts, not for merely the apparent good, but for the true good, the self is thereby is achieving moral self-transcendence; he is existing authentically; he is constituting himself as an originating value, and he is bringing about terminal values, namely a good of order that is truly good and instances of the particular good that are truly good" (462).

"Liberty is exercised within a matrix of personal relations. In the cooperating community persons are bound together by their needs and by the common good that meet their needs" (463).

Terminal values are values that are accepted and executed as "true instances of the particular good" (463). Related to terminal values are the persons that do the choosing. "They are authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their good choices" (463). The subject can will authenticity both for himself and others.

Last we speak of the orientation of the community as a group. Lonergan discusses the orientation of the individual within the community. This main happens with the transcendental notions that "both enable us and require us to advance in understanding, to judge truthfully, to respond to values" (464). This demand requires development of the individual. "One has to acquire the skills and learning of a competent human being in some walk of life. One has to grow in sensitivity and responsiveness to values if one's humanity is to be authentic" (464). However, this development is not guaranteed, success varies with different individuals. There are some who do not succeed. There are some that meet minimum requirements. There are others who develop throughout their life.

As we have shown our orientation is in the way of development, conversion is a "change of direction", a change that is an improvement. 

The Lonergan Reader, Part 3, Chapter 1: Transcendental Method

Lonergan defines method: "A method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. There is a method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where the set of relations form a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where the fruits of such repetition are, not repetitious, but cumulative and progressive" (446).

He gives an example of method in the sciences. In the natural sciences method direct inquiries. It demands "accurate observation and description": both recur as inquiry. It encourages discovery and discoveries recur. It calls for the "formulation of discoveries in hypothesis" and formulation of hypothesis recur. It deduces implications of hypothesis, and the deductions recur. "It keeps urging that experiments be devised and performed to check the implications of hypothesis against observable fact, and such processes of experimentation recur" (446).

Lonergan states that there are four levels of conscious intentionality. Lonergan explains, "In our dream states consciousness and intentionality commonly are fragmentary and incoherent. When we awake, they take on a different hue to expand to four successive, related, but qualitatively different levels. There is the empirical level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move. There is an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression. There is the rational level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, pass judgment on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement. There is the responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions" (448).

All four levels we are conscious and intentional. At all four levels we are aware of ourselves "but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different" (448).

At the empirical level we are similar to other animals. However, this level leads to higher levels. Lonergan writes, "The data of sense provoke inquiry, inquiry leads to understanding, understanding expresses itself in language. Without the data there would be nothing for us to inquire about and nothing to be understood. Yet what is sought by inquiry is never just another datum but the idea or form, the intelligible unity or relatedness, that organizes the data into intelligible wholes. Again, without the effort to understand and its conflicting results, we would have no occasion to judge" (448). Judging leads us to making decisions and action on them. At this level emerges the choosing of values, of making judgments on value.

Lonergan states that the transcendentals are "comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant in cultural change"(449).

The transcendentals are: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. Be attentive to the data at the empirical level. Be intelligent as you seek to understand, get insight at the intellectual level. Be reasonable as you make judgments at the rational level. Be responsible as you make choices on the level of deliberation. "So intelligence takes us beyond experiencing to ask what and why and how and what for. Reasonableness takes us beyond answers of intelligence to ask whether the answers are true and what they mean really is so. Responsibility goes beyond fact and desire and possibility to discern between what truly is good and what only apparently is good" (450).